INTRODUCTION
For years, the Republic of Sudan has been embroiled in war and conflict. For over two decades, from 1983 to 2005, the largely Islamicdominated government of President Omar al-Bashir fought the mainly Christian rebel movement of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in a violent civil war. 2 Then, in 2003, two western Sudanese rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began an uprising in the Darfur region of Sudan. 3 Armed militias retaliated against the rebel groups in an effort to drive black Sudanese persons from the region, CARDOZO 
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In response to the situation in Darfur, the United Nations Security Council referred the grave situation in the region to the International Criminal Court in 2005. 8 The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced the launch of a formal inquiry into the situation in 2005 . 9 This resulted in the issuance of arrest warrants on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide for Ahmed Haroun, the governor of the state of Kordofan, and Ali Kosheib, a militia leader. 10 Most significantly, an arrest warrant was issued in 2009 for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. When President al-Bashir was indicted, it was the very first time an incumbent head of state had ever been indicted by the International Criminal Court. 7 About Us, SAVE DARFUR COALITION, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/about (last visited Apr. 18, 2012) ("Around the country and across the globe, the Save Darfur Coalition is inspiring action, raising awareness and speaking truth to power on behalf of the people of Darfur. Working with world leaders, we are demanding an end to the genocide, and our efforts are getting results."). The Save Darfur Coalition consists of approximately 180 religious, political, and human rights organizations which are advocating for a response to the events in Darfur.
Organizational Even prior to the al-Bashir indictment, Sudan saw promise for a move away from the darkness of war and conflict and began to look towards a new era of increased promise for peace. In 2005, a monumental Comprehensive Peace Agreement was entered into by the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan, which formally ended the ongoing civil war. 12 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also provided a timetable which would allow southern Sudan the opportunity to vote on a referendum of independence. 13 From January 9 through January 15, 2011, the people of southern Sudan voted for independence, with 98.8% voting to secede. 14 On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan formally became a new, independent African nation. 15 But overshadowing this new era of a greater promise for peace is a long history of Sudanese support for terrorism. 16 In fact, Sudan is still 18 One of the three main critical objectives of the Obama administration concerning its current policy with Sudan is to ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.
19 This is part of the ongoing fight against terrorism.
The fight against terrorism, however, is not comprised exclusively of the counterterrorism efforts of federal agencies and military operations in Afghanistan and other locations throughout the world. It is also a judicial war, where the family members of those injured or killed by acts of international terrorism materially supported by a state sponsor of terrorism can obtain justice and relief in American courts. 20 the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in several draw downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the early-mid 1990s. Sudan's Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996."); Lucien J. Dhooge Despite congressional action, the family members of the deceased sailors still have not recovered damages for emotional loss suffered as a result of the bombing. Following the decision in Rux III, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit (Rux IV) , contending that Congress's creation of the private right of action in 28 U.S.C. §1605A took precedence over the exclusive remedy of the DOHSA. 32 The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments in Rux IV and held that the DOHSA provided an exclusive remedy.
33
The plaintiffs moved for leave to supplement their fourth amended complaint, but the Fourth Circuit held the appeal to be moot (Rux V) . 34 Prior to the decision in Rux V, but shortly following the decision in Rux IV, the plaintiffs refiled the case, with a different lead plaintiff (Avinesh Kumar).
35
Most recently, in September 2011, all but four family members were denied recovery of emotional loss by the Eastern District of Virginia in the Kumar v. Republic of Sudan decision on the grounds that their claims for emotional loss were barred by res judicata and because a contrary decision would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. 36 The pursuit of damages for emotional loss continues, as the decision is currently on appeal with the Fourth Circuit. This Article 28 Rux v One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. 40 For nearly two centuries, from the founding of the United States until the 1950s, absolute immunity remained the default doctrinal rule concerning the liability of a foreign state in American courts. However, following World War II, foreign states began performing roles outside of the sphere of official governmental acts, such as private and commercial functions.
41
A shift away from the doctrinal rule of absolute immunity started to occur in the 1950s, when the executive and judicial branch started to adopt a more "restrictive view" of sovereign immunity. 42 This shift toward the restrictive view was finally codified in the 1970s by congressional action with the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
45 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act includes a number of exceptions to the general rule concerning the immunity of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, including the explicit or implicit waiver exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), the "commercial activities" exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), and the "noncommercial torts" exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 46 Keller, supra note 39. 47 Id. 63 Id. 64 Id. at 1036 ("Clearly, Congress's authorization of a cause of action against officials, employees, and agents of a foreign state was a significant step toward providing a judicial forum for the compensation of terrorism victims. Recognizing a federal cause of action against foreign states undoubtedly would be an even greater step toward that end, but it is a step that Congress has yet to take. And it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether a cause of action should lie against foreign states.").
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United States may be subject to more lawsuits in foreign states.
65
Cicippio-Puleo did not stand as the final authority concerning the private cause of action. By the end of 2008, Congress would take that very action discussed in Cicippio-Puleo and unambiguously confer a private cause of action against foreign states.
C. The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
Cicippio-Puleo stood as a stern setback to the efforts to hold foreign states accountable for acts of international terrorism. In 2007, the Rux court awarded the family members of seventeen American sailors $7,956,344 in a judgment against the Republic of Sudan. 66 Despite this significant award, the plaintiffs in the case were limited to damages for pecuniary loss under the Death on the High Seas Act. 68 Significantly, the law also provided for recovery of economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages. 69 When the bill was enacted into law, Senator Frank Lautenberg of 65 Id. at 1035 ("While Congress sought to create a judicial forum for the compensation of victims and the punishment of terrorist states, it proceeded with caution, in part due to executive branch officials' concern that other nations would respond by subjecting the American government to suits in foreign countries."). 66 73 See Wedgwood, supra note 16, at 565 ("If a host country permits the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses requests to take responsible action, the host government cannot expect to insulate those facilities against proportionate measures of self-defense."). 74 Rux III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 549 ("Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 until May 1996, when he was expelled from the country under international pressure. He then relocated to Afghanistan."). 75 Id. ("Sudan provided Bin Laden's fledgling terrorist group with a sanctuary within which it could freely meet, organize, and train militants for operations."). 76 Id. 77 Id. at 550 ("As early as 1998, Sudan provided Al-Qaeda members with Sudanese diplomatic passports as well as regular Sudanese travel documentation that facilitated the movement of Al-Qaeda operatives in and out of Sudan."). 78 Id. ("Bin Laden's Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development Company worked With Sudan's support of terrorism, and Congress's approval of the Flatow Amendment, the family members of those killed in the U.S.S. Cole bombing sought justice and relief in American courts. This long and still ongoing journey for justice began with jurisdictional hurdles to overcome.
A. Jurisdictional Issues Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Rux I and II
In Rux I, the issue of jurisdictional causation was the first main legal issue presented. For the case to proceed through the jurisdictional hurdle, the plaintiffs were required to show three distinct elements: 1) the provision of material support by a state sponsor of terrorism; 2) the provision of such support by an official of the state "while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency;" and 3) a causal link between the material support and damages resulting from an act of terrorism. 79 The plaintiffs' allegations concerning Sudan's "aiding and abetting" Al-Qaeda operatives towards the planning and execution of the bombing survived Sudan's motion to dismiss at both the district 80 and appellate 81 court. Most significantly, the court in Rux II was faced with the decision of adopting either a "but for" or "proximate cause" standard of jurisdictional causation. proceed.
85
In the wake of Rux II, plaintiffs need not necessarily chart a direct link between a state sponsor of terrorism's actions and a terrorist event. 86 Instead, the court adopted a "reasonable connection" standard-all that is necessary is for plaintiffs to plead a "reasonable connection" between the actions of a state sponsor of terrorism and a terrorist event.
87
The "proximate cause" standard correctly balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants in civil litigation concerning terrorism, enabling more meritorious cases to proceed. A "but for" requirement would have likely been fatal to the plaintiffs' claims in Rux, as the allegations did not create a direct line between Sudan and its support of Al-Qaeda's commission of the U.S.S. Cole bombing, 88 and would render the state sponsor of terrorism exception virtually ineffectual for similar cases. While only a "low causational threshold" is necessary for cases to proceed, 89 it is still necessary for plaintiffs to make a substantive showing concerning liability 90 in order to recover. State sponsor of terrorism defendants are arguably not substantially burdened by the jurisdictional causation requirement. While jurisdictional causation issues were decided favorably for the plaintiffs in the Rux II decision in 2006, Rux III would cause a substantial hurdle for full recovery.
B. Liability Issues Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Rux III
On March 13-14, 2007, Rux III was tried. 91 Sudan attended, but did not proffer any evidence and only made a brief argument at the end of the trial. 92 The court noted that of the fifty-nine plaintiffs in the case, many experienced depression, among other physical ailments, following the U.S.S. Cole bombing. 93 It found, with substantial evidence, that Sudan's material support of Al-Qaeda led to the murders 85 Id. ("[The proximate cause standard] serves simultaneously to weed out the most insubstantial cases without posing too high a hurdle to surmount at a threshold stage of the litigation."). 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 
94
While the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act bestows on the courts jurisdiction to hear cases against foreign states, it does not provide a corresponding private cause of action to establish liability. 95 However, cases have firmly established that a private cause of action can be derived from state common or statutory law, or federal law. 96 Many of these cases involved recovery of state law damages for emotional loss, including intentional infliction of emotional distress. But the court fell short for the plaintiffs in Rux III, and damages for emotional loss were barred.
The court in Rux III faced the question of which law to applyfederal maritime law, state common or statutory law, the DOHSA, or a combination of laws. Rux III was a case of first impression concerning the application of the DOHSA since it involved a terrorist attack of a U.S. vessel on foreign territorial waters. 97 The plaintiffs contended that liability should be governed by Virginia law concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress, which would allow for recovery of emotional loss, 98 but Sudan argued that the only basis for recovery was under the DOHSA, 99 which limits damages to pecuniary losses sustained by plaintiffs.
100
The court agreed with Sudan that the DOHSA applied to the case, 101 and that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy lay with the DOHSA.
102
The court articulated the rationale that Congress intended to create a 94 Id. at 554. 95 uniform statutory remedy for wrongful death on the high seas. 103 In addition, the court indicated that Congress had amended the DOHSA in 2000 to permit recovery of non-pecuniary damages involving commercial aviation accidents on the high seas beyond twelve nautical miles from the shore of any country, 104 but had not explicitly done so for accidents on the high seas. 105 Thus, the family member plaintiffs of the seventeen deceased American servicemen and servicewomen were limited to recovery in the amount of $7,956,344. 106 The Rux III court had the opportunity to write a "clean slate" 107 concerning the state sponsor of terrorism exception and permitting recovery of nonpecuniary damages, but tragically chose not to do so. The court essentially abdicated this question to the legislative branch, but as will be discussed later with the Kumar case, the Kumar court inappositely held that the legislative branch exceeded its constitutional authority in response to the holding in Rux III when it enacted the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, included as part of the NDAA.
One of the great tragedies in the Rux line of cases is that the family members' attempts at relief for emotional loss could have been resolved in Rux III, but were not. The court in Rux III grounded its decision on the basis that the DOHSA had preemptive effect over Virginia state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, in essence becoming an exclusive remedy. Outside of the court's analysis, taking this rationale a step further are traditional tort cases involving the exclusive remedy defense of an employer concerning worker's compensation. It is a general doctrinal rule today that an employee who is injured within the scope of his or her employment is limited to the exclusive remedy of worker's compensation. 108 However, certain exceptions apply, such as the exception for intentional torts, because of the policy reason that to hold otherwise would create the potential effect where employers could intentionally abuse employees and still only be liable to the employee under the state worker's CARDOZO PUB.
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109
Similar to the exception of intentional torts from worker's compensation, which is a policy exception to the exclusive remedy rule, the court in Rux III should have fashioned a public policy exception for the DOHSA. To do so would have upheld the clear intent of Congress in permitting family members of victims of terrorism the ability to obtain justice in the courts. 110 Furthermore, it prevents inequitable results concerning relief relating to the location of acts of terrorism materially supported by state sponsors of terrorism. If the U.S.S. Cole bombing had occurred on a commercial airliner less than twelve miles off the coast of Yemen on the high seas, non-pecuniary damages could be recovered under the DOHSA by the family members; but in the case of the U.S.S. Cole, since the bombing occurred on an American naval vessel on the high seas, non-pecuniary damages were not allowed to be recovered. It is highly unlikely that Congress, considering the purposes and policies of the state sponsor of terrorism exception, could have intended such an inequitable result to occur.
Another influential commentator has recently noted this inconsistency where loss of society damages are recoverable for torts on land, but not for a death on the high seas on a vessel. 111 The court in Rux III even remarked it sympathized "greatly" with the plaintiffs 112 despite its decision denying non-pecuniary damages. With this gap in remedies, and the inequitable result of Rux III, Congress soon roared back into the picture with the passage of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. 109 See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1650-1651 ("Refusing to deem workers' compensation a license for employers to abuse employees, these courts find it unacceptable to immunize employers from bearing full tort damages for intentional injuries. Most courts reconcile this exception with the exclusive remedy language by arguing that intentional torts fall outside the statutory scheme because they are not accidental or employment related as required by the statutes. Thus, tort action is permitted as an alternative, rather than an addition, to the workers' compensation remedy."). 110 Marzen, supra note 53, at 523 ("In enacting the exception, Congress had three goals in mind: (1) provide a means of relief for the victims of terrorism and their families to obtain justice in the courts, (2) punish guilty state sponsors of terrorism for their actions in supporting terrorist activities, and (3) deter states from supporting terrorism or committing terrorist acts in the future.").
111 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Death At Sea: A Sad Tale of Disaster, Injustice, and Unnecessary Risk, 71 LA. L.R. 787, 800 (2011) ("Where a tortious death occurs on land, the majority rule is that loss of society damages are recoverable, but not on the high seas."). 112 Rux III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
C. Congress Strikes Back-The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Rux IV
Following the decision in Rux III, Congress responded by passing the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act as part of the NDAA, 113 which created a new private right of action 114 under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to allow recovery for "solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages" against state sponsors of terrorism. 115 This action directly responded to the decision in Rux III. The family member plaintiffs then filed a motion in the Eastern District of Virginia to reopen the case and enter judgment under the new private cause of action in Rux IV. 116 With the enactment of the new private cause of action, a corresponding legal question arose-would the new private cause of action apply retroactively to pending cases?
Congress permitted retroactive application of the new private cause of action in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A in one circumstance under the NDAA-through the "refiling" of an action under § 1083(c)(2). However, the same effect could also be achieved by the filing of a completely new action ("related action") under § 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA. 117 Under the "refiling" procedure, if a plaintiff detrimentally relied upon the former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (the state sponsor of terrorism exception) as "creating a cause of action" and if the case was pending when the NDAA became law, the plaintiff was mandated to "refile" the suit within sixty days, including a cause of action based upon the new 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
118
If the plaintiff did not detrimentally rely upon the former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) as creating a private cause of action, then all hope was not lost. The NDAA permitted the filing of a "related action" arising out of the same act or incident under § 1083(c)(3) if a plaintiff had timely commenced a related action under § 1605(a)(7), and then filed the new action within sixty days from the later of the date of the entry of judgment in the original action or the date of the NDAA's In Rux IV, once again, the family members' quest for damages for emotional pain and suffering was denied. The court held that the plaintiffs could not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1605A retroactively since they did not rely upon the former 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) as creating a private cause of action. 120 In its holding, the court followed Simon v. Republic of Iraq in holding that the new statute is not automatically retroactive.
121
The court also reserved ruling on the separation of powers issues concerning the NDAA, stating in dictum that Congress arguably transferred the conduct of foreign affairs from the executive branch to private litigants in violation of Article II of the United States Constitution.
122
Once again, the judiciary had the clear opportunity to fashion a remedy for the family members to recover damages for their emotional loss in Rux IV, and once again, the court failed to act to permit a remedy. While the court described the situation that the plaintiffs encountered as a "tragedy,"
123 it held that no judicial remedy was fashioned although the clear intention of Congress, as a policy rationale, was to provide relief for emotional loss. Furthermore, the court failed to fashion a remedy when the circumstances surrounding the jurisprudence of the former § 1605(a)(7) clearly prejudiced plaintiffs' remedies in this instance. The court acknowledged that the likely reason for the former § 1605(a)(7) not being pleaded specifically as creating a private cause of action in the instant case was that the court had ruled otherwise in Cicippio-Puleo. 124 For the plaintiffs to rely upon the former § 1605(a)(7) as creating a private cause of action at the time their original complaint was filed would be to completely disregard the current state of caselaw at the time. Thus, holding that "refiling" would not be permitted under the circumstances yielded an unfair and tragic result.
With the ruling in Rux IV, all of the plaintiffs' avenues of relief were not foreclosed as the "related action" provision of § 1083(c)(3) still remained. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal five days after the 119 decision, 125 but then the plaintiffs filed a completely new action prior to the disposition of the appeal. 126 The appeal was rendered moot in a decision by the Fourth Circuit on February 3, 2011 in Rux V. 127 The stage was then set for the Eastern District of Virginia, once again, for a third time, to examine the issue of providing relief for the family members of the victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing for emotional loss.
III. KUMAR V. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN: THE THIRD ATTEMPT TO RECOVER EMOTIONAL LOSS DAMAGES
Undeterred by the holding in Rux IV, the plaintiffs filed a completely new action on April 15, 2010 seeking emotional loss damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, including two additional plaintiffs who were not parties in the Rux line of cases. 128 The third opportunity would not be a charm for the plaintiffs.
Despite the filing of the new action, the district court denied the plaintiffs any relief for damages for emotional loss in the Kumar v. Republic of Sudan decision on September 19, 2011. 129 The court found that the plaintiffs could not file a "related" suit pursuant to § 1083(c) of the NDAA since they did not file the suit within sixty days after the entry of judgment (December 8, 2009) in the underlying Rux case, as was required by § 1083(c). 130 The court noted the plaintiffs filed the new complaint on April 15, 2010-128 days after the court's entry of judgment.
131
Secondly, the court also found that the doctrine of res judicata barred all of the plaintiffs' claims (with the exception of the plaintiffs not named at the time the Rux judgment was entered). 132 The court made this finding despite caselaw holding that cases involving the state sponsor of terrorism exception were not barred by res judicata if they involved claims which could not have been raised in prior litigation.
133
Once again, the district court circumvented the clear intention of 125 Congress in denying the plaintiffs' relief for damages for emotional loss. Instead, the court found ample room to criticize Congress in its creation of § 1083, contending Congress violated the doctrine of separation of powers in enacting § 1605A. 134 There is still room for change, however, and a different final outcome-the decision in Kumar, which is currently set for appeal before the Fourth Circuit. 135 Even despite the decision in Kumar, the overall legacy of the Rux line of cases remains positive. Rather than hindering U.S. foreign policy interests, the Sudan example overall actually remains a relatively positive illustration for U.S. foreign policy interests.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF KUMAR V. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, THE LEGACY OF THE RUX CASES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE JUDICIAL WAR ON TERROR

A. Analysis of the Kumar Decision
With the Kumar decision, the prospect of judicial relief for victims and family members of terrorism to recover damages for emotional loss is in serious peril. On the one hand, the court in Rux IV called the fact that the plaintiffs could not receive damages for emotional loss a "tragedy."
136 On the other hand, that same court in Kumar definitely slammed the door on any possibility of relief, despite congressional action, and blasted Congress's efforts as a "deliberate effort to change the outcome in cases that have already been fully decided."
137
In essence, the court was trying to eat cake, but yet have it too. However, the end result and criticism of § 1083 on separation of powers grounds places the future of § 1605A, and the future of the judicial war on terror, in jeopardy.
In Kumar, the court had the opportunity to follow the precedent set by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation case in declining to give res judicata effect to prior actions under the prior state sponsor of terrorism exception statute (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). 138 In that case, the court found that res judicata did not preclude claims that were litigated 134 Kumar, 2011 WL 4369122, at *10-11. 135 This was confirmed with a telephone conversation the author had with a representative of the office of Hall, Lamb and Hall, P.A., counsel for plaintiffs in the matter. 136 under state law under the old 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) statute at a time when no direct federal cause of action existed. 139 Thus, independent actions would be permitted to be filed as a result of the decision.
But no such relief has been granted by the Kumar court. The Kumar court appeared to hinge most of its hesitance to allow an independent action on res judicata and the separation of powers, depriving judgments of their conclusive effect.
140
But the court completely glossed over the fact that the former state sponsor of terrorism exception and new 28 U.S.C. § 1605A are completely different statutes-the former state sponsor of terrorism exception statute is a jurisdictional "pass-through" statute while the new § 1605A confers a specific new regime of statutory rights and remedies. 141 In fact, as the court in In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation noted, the new § 1605A "includes greater remedies, 142 more robust judgment enforcement provisions, 143 and other mechanisms intended to better promote and execute the federal interest in deterring terrorist attacks and compensating victims."
144 It is also critical to note that § 1083 of the NDAA, which created 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, has no provision that expressly allows for the reopening, reexamination, or abrogation of prior judgments. 145 Since 28 U.S.C. § 1605A is a completely new federal statutory cause of action, and could not have been asserted in the underlying action in the Rux line of cases, the Fourth Circuit should permit this cause of action to be asserted by the Kumar plaintiffs.
Permitting the Kumar plaintiffs to assert the 28 U.S.C. § 1605A claim would also fulfill Congress's intent to provide relief for emotional loss damages for family members of terrorism victims. Significantly, the House Conference Report for § 1083 envisioned a retroactive and expansive reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. 146 In addition, two years earlier, 139 Id. Congress had also raised the death gratuity benefit for eligible armed forces survivors who die in active duty from $12,000 to $100,000.
147
Not permitting the family members of victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing to recover damages for emotional loss would frustrate Congress's intent and once again put Congress in the position of having to remedy judicial error. Also, to permit the family members of the victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing to recover emotional loss damages through 28 U.S.C. § 1605A does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The court in Kumar expressed the concern that Congress in § 1083 attempted to deliberately change the outcome in cases already fully decided on the merits. 148 As the court in In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation indicated, in enacting § 1083, Congress and the executive branch reached a "delicate legislative compromise"-and thus "the Judicial Branch should be extremely hesitant about intervening in a way that would unravel those efforts."
149 The court's holding in Kumar, denying relief for emotional loss damages, hinders those efforts, and thus violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society dictates that the Kumar plaintiffs' claims not be discarded on separation of powers grounds. In Japan Whaling Ass'n, the Supreme Court examined a declaratory relief and injunction action filed by several wildlife conservation groups, which alleged that the Secretary of Commerce breached a statutory duty with respect to enforcement of international whaling quotas. 150 The Supreme Court stated that "one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones."
151 One noted scholar has argued that where liability is created by a federal statute (as in the case of the "state sponsor of terrorism exception" to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act), then separation of powers this section."). concerns "simply have no relevance." 152 The Kumar plaintiffs' claims for emotional loss damages must be allowed to move forward, since the legislative and executive branch authorized § 1605A. 153 Finally, the court in Kumar overlooked the fact that the ultimate responsibility for designating state sponsors of terrorism lies with the executive branch. The way § 1605A is codified allows only "state sponsors of terrorism," as designated by the State Department, to be held liable in court. At any point, if the executive branch held serious concerns about the effects of civil judgments on state sponsors of terrorism, the State Department could always revoke that designation at any time; instead, the executive branch has implicitly encouraged civil lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism with the adoption and implementation of § 1605A.
The Fourth Circuit currently has the opportunity to correctly resolve this question and to allow recovery of damages for emotional loss and fulfill the intention of Congress and the executive branch. Even despite the recent decision in Kumar, the Rux line of cases presents a current example of modest success in the judicial war on terror. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A faces additional challenges moving forward and has faced a number of academic critiques.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, Judicial Fact-finding, and U.S. Foreign Policy
Perhaps the most vocal critique of the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as well as of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A is that private civil lawsuits will adversely affect U.S. foreign policy interests. A large part of this critique centers around the adequacy of domestic courts to examine complex foreign policy issues. An official in the administration of President George W. Bush, Professor John Yoo, contends that American courts are not effective at measuring the costs and benefits of such cases, 154 and instead, decide the cases using a more normative, moral judgment. 155 
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156
In addition, the state sponsor of terrorism exception has been criticized on the grounds that premature findings of fact are made and that large judgments could be awarded on "barely-ripe intelligence evidence."
157
In examining the Rux line of cases, none of these concerns are even closely warranted. In the trial stage of the case on the liability issues in Rux III, the plaintiffs presented much more than "barely-ripe" evidence. The findings of fact concerning liability in the Rux III trial was not only based on concrete evidence, but based on "substantial evidence" that Sudan's material support of Al-Qaeda led to the deaths of the seventeen American servicemen and servicewomen on the U.S.S. Cole. 158 Furthermore, in the Rux line of cases, expert testimony was proffered by the plaintiffs which chartered a causal link between Sudan and Al-Qaeda. 159 The experts included R. James Woolsey, the Director of the CIA from 1993 to 1995. 160 Any such concerns over "premature" fact-finding were certainly alleviated with the experts in the Rux III case. In the future, courts can alleviate the concern of "premature" fact-finding by requiring expert testimony in cases involving 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. This requirement is certainly reasonable and alleviates any concerns over hindering U.S. foreign policy interests.
C. The Legality of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A Under International Law
Another critique of the state sponsor of terrorism exception concerns its legality under customary international law.
One 156 Bahr, supra note 20, at 1157. 157 Id. at 1157-58 ("In the fog of war, however, particularly a war as amorphous and illdefined as a war on terror, a court's legal finding of fact could be nothing more than a premature policy declaration, and could later be determined to be extremely incorrect. Therefore, courts hearing [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] Terrorism Exception cases, involving either civilian or servicemember plaintiffs, should be very cautious to grand judgments-particularly large, multi-million dollar judgments-against foreign states based on barely-ripe intelligence evidence."). 158 commentator, William P. Hoye, argues that the general rule is that sovereign governments are immune from civil suit to the extent that they have not waived their immunity. 161 Hoye also states that there is no "legal authority under which international law would permit one state to brand another sovereign state a sponsor of terrorism unilaterally and declare its own domestic courts as the final arbiter of victim compensation for acts of terrorism sponsored by the branded terrorist state." 162 Finally, according to the doctrine of sovereign equality, since states are sovereign and equal, Hoye contends that one sovereign state cannot impose its will upon another sovereign state. 163 Hoye's critique, and critiques of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A under international law, overlook the emerging acceptance of the doctrines of passive personality jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction. Passive personality jurisdiction permits a state to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon a victim's nationality. 164 Under the passive personality principle, since the servicemen and servicewomen killed on the U.S.S. Cole were U.S. nationals, the United States could permissibly exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over Sudan.
At one time, the United States disfavored the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction. 165 But over time, it has not only been accepted in the United States 166 but arguably has emerged as a norm of customary international law as objections to it have decreased. 167 28 U.S.C. § 1605A is justified under international law under the passive personality principle.
Furthermore, it has also been argued that American courts may exercise jurisdiction over human rights abuses committed abroad through the principle of universal jurisdiction. 168 Universal jurisdiction allows any state to exercise jurisdiction over egregious violations of international law in order to uphold the international community's 161 Hoye, supra note 20, at 138. 162 Id. 163 collective interest in preventing such acts. 169 Material support for terrorism has become one such actionable norm under international law. 170 Universal jurisdiction thus also sanctions 28 U.S.C. § 1605A under international law.
D. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the Establishment of a Victim's Compensation Fund
Other commentators have suggested the replacement of the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act with a victim's compensation fund for the family members of victims of terrorism, to be administered at either the international 171 or domestic level. 172 A victim's compensation system has been advocated on the international level on the basis that the system would be global, multilateral, not be subject to challenges under international law, and would be more "legitimate, efficient, and fair." 173 It has also been argued it could provide for a more efficient and expeditious compensation system, 174 and that it would eliminate inequalities in compensation. 175 Finally, it is contended that elimination of the exception and replacement with a compensation system may better deter terrorism. 176 As for the establishment of an international compensation system, numerous issues prevent this alternative from ever being a realistic possibility. Where would the money to compensate victims come from? Given the fact the United States has still not become a member of the International Criminal Court, would all nations even participate in such a system? Would a fund even work to deter terrorism? Would it even be fair to subject the emotional loss of domestic citizens of terrorism to a global entity which may or may not even provide any form of meaningful relief? An international compensation system is implausible.
As for a domestic victim's compensation system, such a system appears in many ways similar to the domestic worker's compensation system. The worker's compensation system represents in essence a "trade off" between the interests of employers and employeesemployers are granted immunity from tort actions, and employees are guaranteed swift compensation. 177 However, the trade-off for victims of terrorism is not favorable for their interests: arguably, a compensation fund would guarantee compensation, but would come with the loss of litigation rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, a statute which provides rights and remedies guaranteed by Congress. Furthermore, worker's compensation is a system where compensation is guaranteed irrespective of fault. The establishment of a victim's compensation fund would take the fault inquiry out of litigated cases involving 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and leave victims with one less avenue for bringing closure to their losses.
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Such a result would be unsympathetic to the family members of victims of terrorism.
E. The Future of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the Republic of Sudan
28 U.S.C. § 1605A is an important tool in the war on terrorism. Arguably, civil litigation will bring greater accountability to the nations on the state sponsors of terrorism list who give material support to terrorism, and thus make it less likely that these acts occur in the future.
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The example of the Rux line of cases gives anecdotal evidence of this positive effect.
As in Rux III, Sudan's material support of terrorism and Al-Qaeda in the late 1990s had a causal connection to the U.S.S. Cole bombing. President Omar al-Bashir was President of Sudan at the time. He remains President. But instead of civil lawsuits against Sudan jeopardizing U.S.-Sudanese relations, foreign policy relations have actually become less hostile. Sudan and South Sudan divided, relatively peacefully, into two nations in 2011. 180 And the specter of the Republic 177 Marzen, supra note 108, at 872. 178 Shipman, supra note 20, at 569 ("While judgments rendered in American courts may often be unenforceable, victims may nevertheless gain some closure by establishing liability-a crucial part of the healing process."). 179 Id. at 570. of Sudan being taken off of the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism does not seem as remote as it once appeared.
Despite this progress, violence still continues in the Nuba mountains region of the southern part of Sudan. Since June 2011, reports indicate that the Sudanese military has been engaged in an indiscriminate bombing campaign of the Nuba mountains region in an offensive against the SPLM-North. 181 Reports have recently indicated that the Sudanese government has been bombarding the region and blocking road access for aid workers delivering necessary emergency supplies to the civilians in the area. 182 These reports have also garnered the attention of Congress. Actor George Clooney testified before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 2012 to report on a visit during which he witnessed violence in the region. He was also arrested for protesting at the Sudanese embassy in Washington, D.C. 183 Further, a former key United Nations official, Mukesh Kapila, has described the violence as "literally a score-earth policy" and has compared it to the former situation in Darfur. 184 This violence threatens the progress of the promising developing relationship between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. While it is unclear if the situation will result in a full-blown conflict between the two countries, this development makes it less likely the Obama administration will consider removing Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in the immediate future.
Today, one of the three main policy goals in the administration of President Obama is to ensure that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists. 185 That goal does not run inimical to permitting family members of victims of terrorism to seek remedies in judicial lawsuits against Sudan for its past material support of terrorism. With civil litigation, the errors of the past can be addressed. In addition, the specter of potential civil lawsuits, as well as the possibility of being taken off of the State Department state sponsors of terrorism list, can be an incentive for Sudan to continue to cooperate in the war on terrorism, and also to cease its attacks in the Nuba mountains region of the southern part of Sudan.
CONCLUSION
The case of Sudan lies as a bright spot of hope in the judicial war on terror. While much criticism has been leveled at the state sponsor of terrorism exception on the basis that judicial action may actually impede the war on terror, the Sudan case can be viewed as a modest success. Sudan has cooperated heavily with the United States in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and allowed the people of South Sudan to peacefully hold a referendum to determine their future. It has also cooperated enough with the United States for the Obama administration to reexamine the issue of the State Department designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. In addition, in Rux III, the family members of victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing recovered damages for their pecuniary losses for Sudan's material support of terrorism. Despite these developments, great challenges remain with the disturbing reports of continued violence in the Nuba mountains region and possible indiscriminate bombing of civilians in the region by the Sudanese military.
Promise may be on the horizon, and assuming the current conflict in the Nuba mountains region is peacefully resolved, the State Department may conceivably remove Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism if it continues to cooperate in the worldwide coalition against Al-Qaeda and takes meaningful steps toward peace with South Sudan.
Despite promise with Sudan, the pursuit of justice for the family members of the victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing continues. Unfortunately, the Kumar case has placed a major roadblock in the recovery of emotional losses.
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The future relevance of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, as well as justice for victims of terrorism, currently lies in the hands of the Fourth Circuit. A famous legal maxim is the saying, "Justice delayed, is justice denied."
